Usually, no. This does not mean that state intervention cannot have bad effects on the economy or society. Given the state's centralised, bureaucratic nature, it would be impossible for it not to have bad effects. State intervention can and does make bad situations worse in many cases. As Malatesta notes, "the practical evidence [is] that whatever governments do is always motivated by the desire to dominate, and is always geared to defending, extending and perpetuating its privileges and those of the class of which it is both the representative and defender." [Anarchy, p. 21]
However, for economic liberals (or, as we would call them today, neo-liberals or "conservatives"), state intervention is the root of all evil, and for them, it is precisely the state's interference with the market which causes the problems that society blames on the market.
But such a position is illogical, for "whoever says regulation says limitation: now, how conceive of limiting privilege before it existed? ... [I]t would be an effect without a cause" and so "regulation was a corrective to privilege" and not vice versa. [P-J Proudhon, System of Economic Contradictions, p. 371] As Polyani explains, the neo-liberal premise is false, because state intervention always "dealt with some problem arising out of modern industrial conditions or, at any rate, in the market method of dealing with them." [Karl Polyani, Op. Cit., p. 146] In fact, these "collectivist" measures were usually carried out by convinced supporters of laissez-faire, who were as a rule uncompromising opponents of all forms of socialism (and often introduced to undermine support for socialist ideas caused by the excesses of "free market" capitalism).
Thus state intervention did not spring out of thin air, but occurred in response to pressing social and economic needs. This can be observed in the mid 19th century, which saw the closest approximation to laissez-faire in the history of capitalism. As Takis Fotopoules argues, "the attempt to establish pure economic liberalism, in the sense of free trade, a competitive labour market and the Gold Standard, did not last more than 40 years, and by the 1870s and 1880s, protectionist legislation was back. . . . It was also significant. . . [that all major capitalist powers] passed through a period of free trade and laissez-faire, followed by a period of anti-liberal legislation. ["The Nation-state and the Market," p. 48, Society and Nature, Vol. 3, pp. 44-45]
The reason for the return of protectionist legislation was the Depression of 1873-86, which marked the end of the first experiment with pure economic liberalism. Paradoxically, then, the attempt to liberalise the markets led to more regulation. In light of our previous analysis, this is not surprising. Neither the owners of the country nor the politicians desired to see society destroyed, the result to which unhindered laissez-faire leads. Apologists of capitalism overlook the fact that "[a]t the beginning of the Depression, Europe had been in the heyday of free trade. [Polyani, Op. Cit., p. 216] State intervention came about in response to the social disruptions resulting from laissez-faire. It did not cause them.
Similarly, it is a fallacy to state, as Ludwig Von Mises does, that "as long as unemployment benefit is paid, unemployment must exist." This statement is not only ahistoric but ignores the existence of the involuntary unemployment which caused the state to start paying out a dole in order eliminate the possibility of crime as well as working class self-help, which could conceivably have undermined the status quo. The elite was well aware of the danger in workers organising for their own benefit.
Sadly, in pursuing of ideologically correct answers, capitalist apologists often ignore common sense. If one believes people exist for the economy and not the economy for people, one becomes willing to sacrifice people and their society today for the supposed economic benefit of future generations (in reality, current profits). If one accepts the ethics of mathematics, a future increase in the size of the economy is more important than current social disruption. Thus Polyani again: "a social calamity is primarily a cultural not an economic phenomenon that can be measured by income figures." [Op. Cit., p. 157] And it is the nature of capitalism to ignore and despise what cannot be measured.