What to make of Lenin's suggested model of "democratic centralism" discussed in the last section? It is, to use Cornelius Castoriadis's term, a "revolutionary party organised on a capitalist manner." He argues that in practice the "democratic centralist" party, while being centralised, will not be very democratic. In fact, the level of democracy would reflect that in a capitalist republic rather than a socialist society. In his words:
"The dividing up of tasks, which is indispensable wherever there is a need for co-operation, becomes a real division of labour, the labour of giving orders being separate from that of carrying them out . . . this division between directors and executants tends to broaden and deepen by itself. The leaders specialise in their role and become indispensable while those who carry out orders become absorbed in their concrete tasks. Deprived of information, of the general view of the situation, and of the problems of organisation, arrested in their development by their lack of participation in the overall life of the Party, the organisation's rank-and-file militants less and less have the means or the possibility of having any control over those at the top.
"This division of labour is supposed to be limited by 'democracy.' But democracy, which should mean that the majority rules, is reduced to meaning that the majority designates its rulers; copied in this way from the model of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, drained of any real meaning, it quickly becomes a veil thrown over the unlimited power of the rulers. The base does not run the organisation just because once a year it elects delegates who designate the central committee, no more than the people are sovereign in a parliamentary-type republic because they periodically elect deputies who designate the government.
"Let us consider, for example, 'democratic centralism' as it is supposed to function in an ideal Leninist party. That the central committee is designated by a 'democratically elected' congress makes no difference since, once it is elected, it has complete (statutory) control over the body of the Party (and can dissolve the base organisations, kick out militants, etc.) or that, under such conditions, it can determine the composition of the next congress. The central committee could use its powers in an honourable way, these powers could be reduced; the members of the Party might enjoy 'political rights' such as being able to form factions, etc. Fundamentally this would not change the situation, for the central committee would still remain the organ that defines the political line of the organisation and controls its application from top to bottom, that, in a word, has permanent monopoly on the job of leadership. The expression of opinions only has a limited value once the way the group functions prevents this opinion from forming on solid bases, i.e. permanent participation in the organisation's activities and in the solution of problems that arise. If the way the organisation is run makes the solution of general problems he specific task and permanent work of a separate category of militants, only their opinion will, or will appear, to count to the others." [Social and Political Writings, vol. 2, pp. 204-5]
Castoridis' insight is important and strikes at the heart of the problem with vanguard parties. They simply reflect the capitalist society they claim to represent. As such, Lenin's argument against "primitive" democracy in the revolutionary and labour movements is significant. When he asserts that those who argue for direct democracy "completely" fail to "understand that in modern society this principle can have only a relative application," he is letting the cat out of the bag. [Lenin, Op. Cit., p. 163] After all, "modern society" is capitalism, a class society. In such a society, it is understandable that self-management should not be applied as it strikes at the heart of class society and how it operates. That Lenin can appeal to "modern society" without recognising its class basis says a lot. The question becomes, if such a "principle" is valid for a class system, is it applicable in a socialist society one and in the movement aiming to create such a society? Can we postpone the application of our ideas until "after the revolution" or can the revolution only occur when we apply our socialist principles in resisting class society?
In a nutshell, can the same set of organisational structures be used for the different ends? Can bourgeois structures be considered neutral or have they, in fact, evolved to ensure and protect minority rule? Ultimately, form and content are not independent of each other. Form and content adapt to fit each other and they cannot be divorced in reality. Thus, if the bourgeoisie embrace centralisation and representation they have done so because it fits perfectly with their specific form of class society. Neither centralisation and representation can undermine minority rule and, if they did, they would quickly be eliminated. This can be seen from the fate of radicals utilising representative democracy. If they are in a position to threaten bourgeois society, representative government is eliminated in favour of even stronger forms of centralisation (e.g. fascism or some other form of dictatorship).
Ironically enough, both Bukharin and Trotsky acknowledged that fascism had appropriated Bolshevik ideas. The former demonstrated at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party in 1923 how Italian fascism had "adopted and applied in practice the experiences of the Russian revolution" in terms of their "methods of combat." In fact, "[i]f one regards them from the formal point of view, that is, from the point of view of the technique of their political methods, then one discovers in them a complete application of Bolshevik tactics. . . in the sense of the rapid concentration of forced [and] energetic action of a tightly structured military organisation." [quoted by R. Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924, p. 253] The latter, in his uncompleted biography on Stalin noted that "Mussolini stole from the Bolsheviks . . . Hitler imitated the Bolsheviks and Mussolini." [Stalin, vol. 2, p. 243] The question arises as to whether the same tactics and structures serve both the needs of fascist reaction and socialist revolution? Now, if Bolshevism can serve as a model for fascism, it must contain structural and functional elements which are also common to fascism. After all, no one has detected a tendency of Hitler or Mussolini, in their crusade against democracy, the organised labour movement and the left, to imitate the organisational principles of anarchism or even of Menshevism.
Simply put, we can expect decisive structural differences to exist between capitalism and socialism if these societies are to have different aims. Where one is centralised to facilitate minority rule, the other must be decentralised and federal to facilitate mass participation. Where one is top-down, the other must be from the bottom-up. If a "socialism" exists which uses bourgeois organisational elements then we should not be surprised if it turns out it is socialist in name only. The same applies to revolutionary organisations.As the anarchists of Trotwatch explain:
"In reality, a Leninist Party simply reproduces and institutionalises existing capitalist power relations inside a supposedly 'revolutionary' organisation: between leaders and led; order givers and order takers; between specialists and the acquiescent and largely powerless party workers. And that elitist power relation is extended to include the relationship between the party and class." [Carry on Recruiting!, p. 41]
If you have an organisation which celebrates centralisation, having an institutionalised "leadership" separate from the mass of members becomes inevitable. Thus the division of labour which exists in the capitalist workplace or state is created. Forms cannot and do not exist independently of people and so imply specific forms of social relationships within them. These social relationships shape those subject to them. Can we expect the same forms of authority to have different impacts simply because the organisation has "socialist" or "revolutionary" in its name? Of course not. It is for this reason that anarchists argue that only in a "libertarian socialist movement the workers learn about non-dominating forms of association through creating and experimenting with forms such as libertarian labour organisations, which put into practice, through struggle against exploitation, principles of equality and free association." [John Clark, The Anarchist Moment, p. 79]
As noted above, a "democratic centralist" party requires that the "lower" party bodies (cells, branches, etc.) should be subordinate to the higher ones (e.g. the central committee). The higher bodies are elected at the (usually) annual conference. As it is impossible to mandate for future developments, the higher bodies therefore are given carte blanche to determine policy which is binding on the whole party (hence the "from top-down" principle). In between conferences, the job of full time (ideally elected, but not always) officers is to lead the party and carry out the policy decided by the central committee. At the next conference, the party membership can show its approval of the leadership by electing another. The problems with this scheme are numerous:
"The first problem is the issue of hierarchy. Why should 'higher' party organs interpret party policy any more accurately than 'lower' ones? The pat answer is that the 'higher' bodies compromise the most capable and experienced members and are (from their lofty heights) in a better position to take an overall view on a given issue. In fact what may well happen is that, for example, central committee members may be more isolated from the outside world than mere branch members. This might ordinarily be the case because given the fact than many central committee members are full timers and therefore detached from more real issues such as making a living . . ." [ACF, Marxism and its Failures, p. 8]
Equally, in order that the "higher" bodies can evaluate the situation they need effective information from the "lower" bodies. If the "lower" bodies are deemed incapable of formulating their own policies, how can they be wise enough, firstly, to select the right leaders and, secondly, determine the appropriate information to communicate to the "higher" bodies? As such, given the assumptions for centralised power in the party, can we not see that "democratic centralised" parties will be extremely inefficient in practice as information and knowledge is lost in the party machine and whatever decisions which are reached at the top are made in ignorance of the real situation on the ground? As we discuss in section H.3.8, this is usually the fate of such parties.
Within the party, as noted, the role of "professional revolutionaries" (or "full timers") is stressed. As Lenin argued, any worker which showed any talent must be removed from the workplace and become a party functionary. Is it surprising that the few Bolshevik cadres (i.e. professional revolutionaries) of working class origin soon lost real contact with the working class? Equally, what will their role within the party be? As we discuss in section 3 of the appendix on "What happened during the Russian Revolution?", their role in the Bolshevik party was essentially conservative in nature and aimed to maintain their own position. As Bakunin argued (in a somewhat different context) Marxism always "comes down to the same dismal result: government of the vast majority of the people by a privileged minority. But this minority, the Marxists say, will consist of workers. Yes, perhaps of former workers, who, as soon as they become rulers or representatives of the people will cease to be workers and will begin to look upon the whole workers' world from the heights of the state. They will no longer represent the people but themselves and their own pretensions to govern the people." [Statism and Anarchy, p. 178] Replacing "state" with "party machine" and "the people" by "the party" we get a good summation of the way the Bolshevik cadres did look upon the party members (see section H.5.9). It also indicates the importance of organising today in a socialist manner rather than in a bourgeois one.
That the anarchist critique of "democratic centralism" is valid, we need only point to the comments and analysis of numerous members (and often soon to be ex-members) of such parties. Thus we get a continual stream of articles discussing why specific parties are, in fact, "bureaucratic centralist" rather than "democratic centralist" and what is required to reform them. That almost every "democratic centralist" party in existence is not that democratic does not hinder their attempts to create one which is. In a way, the truly "democratic centralist" party is the Holy Grail of modern Leninism. As we discuss in section H.5.10, their goal may be as mythical as that of the Arthurian legends.